The Air Force's Black DEI Myths

The Best Arguments for DEI: Improved Performance

"The Tuskegee Airmen's Track Record

     The Tuskegee Airmen's most famous mission, in which they went up against German Me 262 fighter jets, came on March 24th, 1945. That day, Colonel Benjamin O. Davis led 43 P-51s of 332nd Fighter Group as bomber escorts for Fifteenth Air Force B-17s, who flew a 1600 mile round trip to raid a tank factory in Berlin. The Luftwaffe put up stiff resistance, sending up FW 190s, Me 163 Komet rocket fighters, and 25 Me 262 jet fighters. Tuskegee Airmen Roscoe Brown, Charles Brantley, and Earl Lane, all managed to shoot down Luftwaffe jets over Berlin that day. The 332nd Fighter Group earned another Distinguished Unit Citation for its feats on that mission.

     In total, the all black squadrons flew 1578 combat missions, including 179 bomber escort missions, and put up some pretty good statistics while they were at it. They lost bombers on only seven missions, for a total of 27 airplanes, compared to an average loss of 46 bombers for other Fifteenth Air Force P-51 fighter groups. They shot down 112 enemy airplanes, destroyed another 150 on the ground, and damaged 148 more. On the ground, they destroyed 600 rail cars, plus 350 trucks and motor vehicles. They also destroyed 40 boats and barges, plus a German torpedo boat.

   Collectively, the Tuskegee Airmen earned three Distinguished Unit Citations (DUC). The first went to the 99th Pursuit Squadron for its performance during the aerial assault on Pantelleria in June of 1943. The 99th earned another DUC in May of 1944, for actions at Monte Cassino. The third Distinguished Unit Citation went to the 332nd Fighter Group (including the 99th Pursuit Squadron plus two other black squadrons, the 100th and 301st) for action over Berlin in March of 1945.

     Despite the predictions of many that blacks were unsuited to fly combat, the Tuskegee Airmen turned out to be some of the best fighter pilots in the US Army Air Forces. During the conflict, Tuskegee Airmen earned 96 Distinguished Flying Crosses, a Silver Star, 14 Bronze Stars, 744 Air Medals, and 8 Purple Hearts."

 If there ever was a performance-based case for diversity in the Air Force's pilot ranks, this is it! Right? The Tuskegee Airmen had a significantly lower "average loss of bombers" than the other Fifteenth Air Force P-51 fighter groups, and the "Tuskegee Airmen turned out to be some of the best fighter pilots in the US Army Air Forces." If combat effectiveness and mission success were the true bar, then the argument for a diverse group of pilots would be empirically settled. As children, we figured out that we should pick the best of whatever group to be on our team if we wanted to win.

     I believe the Tuskegee Airmen may have outperformed their white counterparts despite inferior training, equipment, and fewer replacement pilots for two reasons: General Davis' leadership and the fact that they had more at stake.

"General Davis was a natural leader, a stern disciplinarian and an officer with a clear idea of what his mission was and of the tactics required to carry it out, said Gropman, an author and chairman of the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilization at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Other escort units, according to Gropman, ranged widely to search out enemy fighters. Gen. Davis "told his men to stay with the bombers" that they were assigned to protect. "They were not out looking for glory. They were out to do their mission."

"The Double V Victory
During World War II, African Americans made tremendous sacrifices in an effort to trade military service and wartime support for measurable social, political, and economic gains. As never before, local black communities throughout the nation participated enthusiastically in wartime programs while intensifying their demands for social progress."

According to historical accounts like Gropman's, white fighter pilots were known to fly off and leave bombers unprotected in pursuit of becoming an "Ace," a person who downs a certain number of enemy planes. General Davis gave strict orders against this type of behavior, and it likely contributed to fewer losses of bomber aircraft.

"Originally, everyone assumed that the bombers would be able to defend themselves. When the Germans sent up fighter planes to shoot them down, the allies quickly determined that they needed fighter escorts to make sure, as much as possible, that the bombers reached their targets. Colonel Davis, our commanding officer, provided us with this tactical order of business: chase the German fighter planes away, then come back and protect the bombers against another possible attack. 'We don't want you guys to be aces,' he told us. 'We want you to protect the bombers'…

Our job was to see the German fighters and dive into them before they reached the bombers. We would drop our external fuel tanks and start the dog fight before the enemy fighters could attack the bombers, turning them away. After they had left, we would return to formation, flying above the bombers to fend off attacks from the next group of fighters sent in to shoot down any unescorted bombers.

We also stayed to protect the bombers after they had dropped their loads. By then, some of the bombers would have one or more crippled engines, or they might be on fire or shot up. These stragglers were easy prey for the German fighters who were sent to shoot them down after they had emerged from the field of ground fire, and General Ira C. Eaker, commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Allied Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces, wanted his bombers brought home." Tuskegee Airman Robert L. Martin

"McGee said the Red Tails always waited for the order to peel off from their bomber and pursue a German fighter. 'That's the way we operated,' McGee said. 'The leader would designate. We didn't just leave the bomber because we saw German aircraft. If they were attacking the elements that we were escorting, then we would dispatch a unit to fight them off.'" Brigadier General Charles McGee Tuskegee Airman

African Americans believed that if they made sacrifices to support the war effort, they would be rewarded with greater social, political, and economic freedom at home. The African Americans of the 1940s had no voting rights, lived in segregated facilities, sent their children to segregated schools, and had only recently been able to pass federal anti-lynching legislation. For African Americans, the fight was greater than Pearl Harbor or Hitler and the Nazis.

      In 2012, I met a 90+-year-old white WWII bomber pilot at the screening of "Red Tails," the first Hollywood movie about the Tuskegee Airmen. The Tuskegee Airmen's aircraft had distinctive, signature red tails. Bomber crews were able to recognize their aircraft easily and knew the pilots were black, but didn't care about their race; they cared about their competence.

     The Tuskegee Airmen had such a reputation for being the best bomber escorts that the bomber crews were glad to see them. Bomber crews were glad because the success of the escorts meant life and death to them. In my book, "The Air Force's Black Pilot State of the Union," I devote a whole segment to detailing the incredible loss of life and equipment that the bomber crews experienced.

     Listening to a 90+-year-old white man excitedly confirm the prowess of the Tuskegee Airmen from the perspective of a bomber pilot and watching him embrace the Tuskegee Airmen who were present at the movie premiere was powerful. It's one thing to read historical accounts or interview a Tuskegee Airman, but listening to a white bomber pilot's eyewitness account was a whole other level of validation.

     As powerful as the experience this man and others like him had, however, it wasn't powerful enough to influence leadership in the highest levels of the War Department or the Army Air Corps to change their stance on integration. Integration was not ushered in solely because of proven combat success. The progress made in integrating and advancing the rights of African Americans, like the Tuskegee Airmen, was achieved outside military channels by political leaders.

    General Ira Eaker was mentioned as the commander of Allied bomber forces. Surely, he or members of his staff had the data to show the difference in bomber losses when escorted by the Tuskegee Airmen. We know from history that the War Department and the Army Air Corps vigorously opposed the entry of black aircrews into the combat theatre in Europe. But, I believe the undeniable success of the Tuskegee Airmen made it possible for their involvement in European combat operations to continue. General Davis was able to use proven results in combat to sustain their participation.

     I also believe the man I met and members of other bomber crews made their preference for the Tuskegee Airmen as escorts known to their leadership. These preferences most certainly made it up the bomber chain of command to a certain degree. Unfortunately, I believe it was a cooperation brought on by combat. As soon as combat operations ended, amnesia started to set in, and senior military leaders were content to let the black pilots and their aircrews go back to segregated units despite proven success in combat. If not for the intervention of President Truman, who knows how long African Americans would have remained in separate segregated units.

     In several places in this book, I've talked about a decrease in racial animus facilitated by combat. Life and death situations can force a close-quarters cooperation that transcends bigotry, or the close-quarters cooperation can result in a softening or even shattering of stereotypes and ignorance about race.
It occurs to me, however, that the senior leadership of the War Department and the Army Air Corps were the least likely to benefit from these stereotype-breaking close-quarters operations. The decision-makers with the greatest power to implement change based on demonstrated results in combat had the least exposure to black men in combat.

    Is it possible that their lack of eyewitness accounts and never having to depend on a black man in a life-or-death situation made it possible for them to look past data proving stellar combat success for the Tuskegee Airmen and hold onto the racist underpinnings supporting a segregated military?

    The Air Force became a separate branch of service on September 18, 1947. President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948. The Air Force came into existence as a segregated branch of the armed services despite the combat success and heroism of the Tuskegee Airmen.

   There was never, and won't ever be, a greater proven example of the prowess of African American pilots in combat than the Tuskegee "experiment." The Tuskegee Airmen shattered the expectations of the War Department and the Army Air Corps. The merits of the Tuskegee Airmen in combat were not enough for the military leadership to establish a meritocracy then, and it certainly isn't now, over 75 years later.

   There is one surviving Tuskegee Airman who flew in combat during World War II. His name is Lt. Col. George Hardy. He is 99 years old. Although the Air Force has done a commendable job in the last 10-15 years of reviving the legacy of the Tuskegee Airmen, it is a gesture of respect for what was accomplished in the past rather than a recognition of the current potential that lies within black pilots as a group. 

    There was no urgency to pick black pilots to be "on the team" after World War II when their success was fresh and measurable in terms of lives and equipment saved. And the success of pilots who flew in combat over 75 years ago certainly hasn't led to a sustained effort in the Air Force of today to increase the number of black pilots.

    If proven success in combat isn't the measuring stick, nothing else can be. The argument that DEI will enhance combat effectiveness is a losing argument, not because it isn't true, but because it's not what is most important to the forces that govern the demographic of the military. Those forces include the will of political and military leadership, as well as public opinion. 

     The force of public opinion affects what political leaders are willing to do to enact change in the military. Additionally, I believe, knowingly or unknowingly, the majority white leadership demographic of the military (including the Air Force) preserves systems and processes that benefit the majority. In either case, the driving factor is not demonstrated combat success. It wasn't then, and certainly won't be now when it is not possible to set apart African American contributions as a group and measure their contributions to the success of combat and peacetime operations.

     What if it were possible to identify the combat success and individual contributions of a single stellar African American, an outstanding sample size of one, if you will, to demonstrate the potential of African Americans in combat? Political forces would still trump that. General Brown had one of the most stellar combat records of any Air Force general officer in recent history: 

"I'd like to focus on the portion of Gen. Brown's career from May 2011 to Feb 2014. This stretch of his career is the most fascinating to me and, arguably, outside his selection as Chief of Staff, the most historic. Gen. Brown worked for two years as the Deputy Director in U.S. CENTCOM's Operations Directorate. He had key responsibilities in prosecuting the war in Iraq. He was, as I previously stated, working close to the fight. He later moved to what I believe was one of the most significant jobs for any African American in recent Air Force history.

     Gen. Brown was selected to become the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command. He was in charge of leading the entire air war in Iraq…

May 2011 - May 2013, Deputy Director, Operations Directorate, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

May 2013 - February 2014, Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command; Deputy, Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command, Southwest Asia

March 2014 - June 2015, Director, Operations, Strategic Deterrence, and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces Africa, Ramstein AB, Germany

June 2015 - July 2016, Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Air Combat Command, Southwest Asia
July 2016 - July 2018, Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla."

The retired officer selected to replace General Brown does not have the same proven combat experience or even the required leadership experience. Here's a description of how General Dan Caine became "qualified" to assume the nation's top military post:

"UNCONVENTIONAL PICK
Caine's military career is a far cry from the traditional path to becoming the president's top military adviser. Previous generals and admirals have led a combatant command or a military branch of service.

How far Cain can keep the military out of politics may largely depend on Trump - who in the past has dragged the military into partisan issues.

In a recent re-telling of their first meeting in Iraq, Trump said that Caine was in the hangar where service members started putting on "Make America Great Again" hats.

"They all put on the Make America Great Again hat. Not supposed to do it," Trump said during a speech last year.
"I said, 'you're not supposed to do that. You know that.' They said, 'It's OK, sir. We don't care.'"

"I know he's nontraditional, but that's kind of what this administration looks for," said Chris Miller, who served as Trump's last acting secretary of defense in his first term.

Caine "definitely knows how the Pentagon works," Miller told The Associated Press. Caine has experience, too, in the National Guard and has worked in the private sector.

"He's spent time as a citizen-soldier. The guy's been out, done other things. He brings a perspective that is not traditional for a chairman, which I think will be a breath of fresh air," Miller said.

A question after Brown's firing was whether Trump was seeking a loyalist as chairman of the Joint Chiefs chairman. Trump praised Caine — and condemned the current military leadership — at an unrelated appearance in Miami this past week.

"General ‘Razin’ Caine was — he’s some general. He’s a real general, not a television general,” Trump said Wednesday, two days before his Truth Social post.

“We have the greatest military in the world, but we don’t have the greatest top, top leadership. That’s why Afghanistan was such a horrible situation and so embarrassing and so many other things,” Trump added. “But when we want to, with proper leadership, there’s nobody even close to us.”

  President Trump said, “We don’t have the greatest top, top leadership.” He called General Caine a “real general.” By the strictest definition, “general” in military terms equates to four-star rank. Three-star generals, the rank Dan Caine attained before retiring, are called Lieutenant Generals. What in the new administration qualifies someone to be a top general, a “real general,” if it’s not proven combat success, demonstrated leadership among your peers, or meritocracy?

   When an African American finally meets the highest standards, the standards are changed. Perhaps General Brown should have invested in some MAGA hats. Political will is more powerful than the merit of proven combat success, from the War Department of the 1940s to the present.

    I was encouraged to read an article entitled "The Business Case for DEI" by McKinsey & Company. I am purposely addressing productivity in a business environment as justification for diversity, equity, and inclusion at the end of this chapter for two reasons. The “business” of the military is combat operations, and excelling in military business means excelling in combat. I have discussed that at length.

   The second reason is that the American military, and specifically the Air Force, is a monopoly. The Air Force has no near-peer competitor. There is no other entity that is competing for resources and talent to be America’s premier provider of air combat capability. Because of that, the Air Force can afford to ignore certain aspects of its operations that civilian industries with competitors cannot.

“There have been far-reaching changes in the business environment over the past few years, yet, companies with diverse leadership teams continue to be associated with higher financial returns. Our expanded dataset shows this is true across industries and regions, despite differing challenges, stakeholder expectations, and ambitions.

     The business case for gender diversity on executive teams has more than doubled over the past decade. Each of our reports—2015, 2018, 2020, and now 2023—has found a steady upward trend, tracking ever greater representation of women on executive teams. At each time point we have assessed the data, the likelihood of financial outperformance gap has grown: Our 2015 report found top-quartile companies had a 15 percent greater likelihood of financial outperformance versus their bottom-quartile peers; this year, that figure hits 39 percent (Exhibit 1).
Exhibit 1

    A strong business case for ethnic diversity is also consistent over time, with a 39 percent increased likelihood of outperformance for those in the top quartile of ethnic representation versus the bottom quartile. This has persisted even with eight new economies added in our analysis of 2022 financial data.

    The penalties for low diversity on executive teams are also intensifying. Companies with representation of women exceeding 30 percent (and thus in the top quartile) are significantly more likely to financially outperform those with 30 percent or fewer. Similarly, companies in our top quartile for ethnic diversity show an average 27 percent financial advantage over others (Exhibit 2).

    Both forms of diversity in executive teams appear to show an increased likelihood of above-average profitability. Companies in the top quartile for both gender and ethnic diversity in executive teams are on average 9 percent more likely to outperform their peers.

McKinsey’s case for diversity is firmly based on “outperforming peers.” The Air Force has no peer. Perhaps American or Delta Airlines would have more incentive to study the benefits of diversity if one of their competitors could show an increase in their bottom line due to increased diversity. The Air Force has no such motivation. Who’s to say the Air Force would be more successful in the future if it had more black and or female Airmen or more black or female senior leaders?

    The Defense Department’s firing of many black and female leaders supports my thesis. FIRED: (USAF) General “C.Q.” Brown-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Lisa Franchetti-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Linda Fagan-Coast Guard Chief, (USAF) Lieutenant General Jennifer Short-Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and (USA) Lieutenant General Telita Crossland-Director Defense Health Agency.

Here’s what I wrote about this in “The Air Force’s Black Ceiling”: 

“The most striking differences between the civilian companies I interviewed and the Air Force was the Air Force’s lack of a profit motive, a mission incentive, and a driving force to change its approach to diversity. Delta Airlines relayed how the customers demanded to see more black pilots on flights. McDonald’s shared data on the ‘browning’ of their customer base projected out to the year 2020 and felt that they had a profit-related incentive to have leadership that reflected and understood their client base. Others spoke of lawsuits or very forward-thinking CEOs as a catalyst for the radical changes that needed to be made to increase the diversity of their senior leadership (Defense Business Board, 2004).

The Air Force is the greatest Air Force in the world, with no near rival and an incredibly impressive record in combat. Who says that more minority fighter pilots and minority fighter pilot generals will make the Air Force better?

     There is nothing but the history of black pilots who flew over 75 years ago to suggest that a more diverse fighter pilot force might be of benefit to the Air Force. There are no compelling factors to prompt the Air Force to make radical changes to its culture or personnel policies.

    I did find evidence of African American pilots who weren’t Tuskegee Airmen who had success overseas with other nations, but their success wasn’t on a large enough scale to trigger a significant change in political or military policy: 

“HISTORIC BLACK MILITARY AVIATION ROLE 

Known as the ‘Black Swallow,’ native Georgian Eugene Jacques Bullard flew with the famed Lafayette Escadrille. He fought for France during World War I, becoming the first black military aviator and fighter pilot in May 1917, when Robinson was only age twelve. He engaged in aerial combat, shooting down German aircraft on the Western Front. Bullard received his flight training in France, like Bessie Coleman, because he could not do so in the United States.99” 

“A BLACK AIR FORCE IN ETHIOPIA

With open conflict between Ethiopia and Italy fast approaching, Selassie began to question why his air force, the most modernized branch of his nation's military, should consist solely of well-trained French pilots and not black aviators…

Thanks to pressure exerted by the leaders of the Young Ethiopian Movement, including Ethiopians who had studied in America, Emperor Selassie began to seek out black technicians and experts in the United States in 1932. Simultaneously, Selassie had learned more about the well-publicized African American pilots in the United States, breaking aviation records and performing flying feats of distinction.45

African Americans filling military aviation roles in Ethiopia would fit into a larger program, conceived by African American Professor Earnest Work, who served as the Ethiopian Minister of Education. He encouraged educated black Americans to migrate to Ethiopia to start a new life. An all-black Imperial Ethiopi­ an Air Force would be the pride of not only Ethiopia but also of all of black Africa. In addition, an air force of black pilots would symbolize intellectual, mechanical, and technical equality in the most advanced technical arena-aeronautics-of the white and Western world.46

By 1930, the most well known African American pilot, thanks largely to his unmatched skill in self-promotion, was Hubert Fauntleroy Julian. Unlike Robinson, Julian was not an American. He had been born on the Caribbean island of Trinidad as a British subject. Julian had learned to fly in Canada, before moving to the United States in 1921.

Before Robinson's arrival in Ethiopia Selassie contemplated handing Julian the job of managing the cadet aviation-training program, which was operated by French airmen as part of the emperor's plan of replacing blacks with whites…
With prophetic insight, Robinson viewed Ethiopia as the most visible stage and positive means to promote black aviation to the world, while defending Africa's oldest independent black nation once war erupted.66

Emperor Selassie wired an April 1935 cable and an official invitation for Robinson to join Ethiopia's defense. He offered Robinson an officer's commission in the armed forces, but this offer was made on the condition that Robinson would have to serve in Ethiopia for a period of at least one year. Making a commitment of one year was fully acceptable to Robinson. He made his final decision without reservation or hesitation. Wrote Robinson, ‘Through him [Dr. Bayen], I was given further directions,’ including details about journeying to Ethiopia.71

In the early spring of 1935, Robinson faced a decisive turning point in his young life. He chose to serve in Ethiopia instead of going back to Tuskegee Insti tute to become an aviation instructor, forsaking his most cherished dream

THE SPIRIT OF PAN-AFRICANISM

By this time, Robinson was a firm believer in the spirit of Pan-Africanism, which was part of the ‘Back to Africa’ movement that was popular in black America.

Yet, Robinson contradicted the stereotypical image of an angry black militant who was bitter toward the white world. He continued to enjoy friends and close associations with both races in Mississippi and in Chicago. Robinson knew that people had to be valued not for their color, but based on their positive personal qualities and character. Therefore, even though preparing to risk his life in defending a black nation that he had never seen before against white aggression, Robinson possessed white friends and associates in the aviation community of Chicago, in­ including the officials and instructors at the Curtiss-Wright Aeronautical School, as well as in his everyday life.98

Historically, African Americans had found more freedom on the high seas, where men were treated with greater equality than on American soil.105

While Western Europe and the world only debated or remained apathetic toward Ethiopia's plight, Robinson prepared to take action. He would become the only African American to serve Emperor Selassie and the Ethiopian Army during the war's entirety.

Without African Americans having an opportunity to strike an organized blow against racism in the United States, the upcoming ltalo-Ethiopian War provided a means by which a young black man could fight racism, institutionalized as fascism, on the battlefield.

But what was significant about Robinson's upcoming role in Ethiopia's defense was that it was a solo effort. In this way, Robinson continued his tradition of breaking new ground primarily on his own, leading the way and going where few African Americans dared tread. In psychological terms, it almost seemed as if the more formidable the obstacle, the more Robinson jumped at the chance and rose to the challenge. In addition, he was about to become a military aviator in an active interventionist role even though he was without any combat experience or military experience, except for brief service in the Illinois aviation squadron.

Robinson was about to fulfill an interventionist military aviation role, like the American volunteers of the Lafayette Escadrille during World War I who returned the favor for French support during America's own struggle for independence.

But Ethiopia, unlike the United States, had been a member-ironically sponsored by Italy-of the League of Nations since 1923. However, Western powers desired to maintain the status quo to preserve their own colonial empires. This selfish imperialist priority of the major European powers allowed Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia to grab his own colonies.

The Great Powers were concerned that another Italian defeat by black Ethiopians might lead to unrest among people of color in their own colonial possessions around the world, and thus would allow the sacrifice of Ethiopia, which they viewed as expendable for world stability, in 1935.

Cynical, but realistic in regard to race relations, Robinson later wrote in a 1935 letter that revealed his disillusionment over the world's lack of concern for Ethiopia's tragic plight: ‘the League ofNation[s] is just another White man's bluff. White people will always stick together in the end when it comes to the color question.’134

Robinson was not guilty of exaggeration. Even as part of the secret agreement in which Italy had joined the Allies' side during World War I, Italy's right to Ethiopia had already been recognized by the Western powers for her support against Germany.

“Tellingly, just before the Moscow's launching of the Sputnik satellite into outer space in 1957, another Negro pilot, 26-year-old Howard B. Spears Jr., who had flown earlier for the U.S., applied for Soviet citizenship because, as he said, ‘I want to be treated like a human being’ and he was disgusted with lingering Jim Crow. 15 The U.S. would be compelled to take halting steps away from Jim Crow, not least because of the national security implications exposedby Spears' defection….47 Eventually, the inevitable occurred: a 26-year-old Air Force veteran, Howard B. Spears Jr., applied for Soviet citizenship because he was fed up with Jim Crow.48”

In my 2003 report, the only compelling factor that I could foresee is that the Air Force, because of its failure to demonstrate, as far as minorities were concerned, that there were paths to career success at its highest levels, would become less and less relevant to the minority community as an employer of choice—especially for the best and brightest minorities. It was my belief that over time the impact would be only be felt when these minority communities chose to point their children away from the Air Force, in terms of career choice, and when they decided to vote against Air Force budget dollars.”

In 2003, I predicted that the Air Force’s treatment of minorities would cause the Air Force, over time, to be seen less and less as an employer of choice by the best and brightest minorities. Recent policy decisions by the current administration to halt minority-specific recruiting goals will only make attracting the best and brightest minorities more difficult:

“The Army and other service branches are abandoning recruiting efforts at a prestigious Black engineering event this week, turning down access to a key pool of highly qualified potential applicants amid President Donald Trump's purge of diversity initiatives in the military. Until this week, Army Recruiting Command had a long-standing public partnership with the Black Engineer of the Year Awards, or BEYA, an annual conference that draws students, academics and professionals in science, technology, engineering and math, also known as STEM. The event, which takes place in Baltimore, has historically been a key venue for the Pentagon to recruit talent, including awarding Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarships and pitching military service to rising engineers. Past BEYA events have included the Army chief of staff and the defense secretary. ‘This is one of the most talent-dense events we do,’ one Army recruiter told Military.com on the condition that their name not be used. ‘Our footprint there has always been significant. We need the talent.’"

In a 2021 military.com article, the Air Force stated that it was “confronting drops in interest in joining the military among Black men, Hispanic men, and women in the past few years” with an “aggressive push to show that the service has opportunities for all.” If you combine a declining interest from minorities with a cessation of targeting minorities in recruitment, the abysmal numbers of minorities represented in the Air Force’s senior leadership positions will only get worse.

     Smaller representation by minorities in the senior ranks sustains the myth that qualified minorities don’t exist or only exist in small numbers. Again, representation is not a compelling argument for diversity when the lack of minorities doesn’t affect the Air Force’s bottom line, which is combat operations. History shows us that the military, even the Air Force, only values diversity in times of crisis.

     Crisis for the military is like tax season for H&R Block or the Super Bowl for the NFL. It is the peak of its business operations. In the crisis of World War II, General Eisenhower allowed black service/support troops to fight in combat alongside white soldiers. Combat conditions made diversity a necessity.

     Brigadier General Charles McGee's career exemplifies how the Air Force prioritized diversity during times of crisis but often abandoned it in periods of peace and stability. Crises put the Air Force into an all-hands-on-deck posture. In times of peace and without a competitor for the same resources, the Air Force could afford to ignore someone like Brigadier General McGee, who had some of the greatest combat flying qualifications in the history of the Air Force:

“On August 24, 1944 during a mission to escort B-17s to Czechoslovakia, McGee and two other Tuskegee Airmen each shot down enemy aircraft. McGee’s aerial victory was a German Fw-190.”

“Col McGee is the only person in Air Force history to fly over 100 combat missions in three major wars: 136 in World War II, 100 Korea, and 173 in Vietnam, a total of 409. He was a three-time squadron commander, a chief of maintenance for a fighter wing, a base commander, and the first African-American officer to command a stateside wing after desegregation:

o Commander, 44th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, Commander, 7230th Support Squadron (Jupiter Missile support), Commander, 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
o Commander of Gioia del Colle Air Base, Chief of Maintenance, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing
o Commander, Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base (Commanded Wing and Base)

Col McGee is also a highly decorated combat leader and commanded a flying unit in Vietnam. He had a distinguished 30-year career, and his decorations include the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with Two Clusters, Bronze Star, Air Medal with 25 Clusters.

If Col. McGee were a non-minority with his flying record and track record, I’m convinced he would have thrived in command of “stateside” units. Col. McGee was an extremely versatile officer who held leadership positions in aircraft maintenance, air defense, missile support, and communications. He flew propeller, jet fighter, bomber, and cargo aircraft. He was instrumental in helping future astronaut Charles Borman return to flying status (Smith, 2008). He also fought to give him the highest ratings possible, ratings that he deserved but were against the existing norms—ratings that helped him successfully compete for astronaut training.

     Despite being shuttled back into aircraft maintenance and other ground-based duties after each major war, he was always successful when the Air Force snatched him back into combat flying service.”

In “Black Ceiling,” I used the phrases “shuttled back into aircraft maintenance or other ground-based duties after each major war” and “snatched back into combat flying service” to describe Brigadier General McGee’s career.

     He flew 136 combat missions in WWII as a Tuskegee Airman, then later “became an instructor for pilots for the North American B-25 Mitchell bomber, for the 477th Bombardment Group training to enter the Pacific Theater of the War.” “He commanded the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron in the Philippines from 1951-53, the 7230th Support Squadron in Italy from 1961-63, the 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron from 1967-68 in Vietnam, and was commander of the 1840th Air Base Wing at Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base in Missouri in 1972.”

     Let’s dissect these jobs, dates, and accomplishments. After success in WWII, Brigadier General McGee was sent to instructor duty in bombers. He became a Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander during the Korean “crisis” and flew 100 combat missions. He was not allowed to stay on the bomber/aviator fast track but ended up in ground support and became a support squadron commander. Years later, a crisis erupted in Vietnam. Because of his recognized but unused prowess as an aviator, he was selected to command the 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and had great operational success:

“While I was looking up references for Col McGee’s accomplishments, I stumbled onto the website for the National Museum of the Air Force. I found a section on the website that honored members who had flown over 100 combat missions in Vietnam. Sadly, this awesome repository of Air Force history mentioned nothing about Col. McGee’s membership in the 100 combat mission club—he had 173 combat sorties. Nor did it mention his heroism and leadership during the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive.

‘On January 31, 1968, at the start of the Tet Offensive, Col. McGee was the Commander of the 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (16th TRS) at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base near Saigon. When the Tet Offensive broke out, most of the squadron pilots were at a walled compound off base. There were only six pilots on base, since there was no movement allowed off base. For three days they flew all of the squadron’s missions, including bomber escort in unarmed RF-4C aircraft. Col. McGee said, ‘They didn’t lose a mission.’ (Historynet.com, 2006) (Gathering of Eagles Foundation, n.d.) 

Col. McGee’s tenacity and leadership as the 16th TRS Commander was on clear display for three days before the security restrictions were lifted to allow the pilots that were off base, back onto the base (Godfrey, 2000) (Smith, 2008). In the process, he flew a significant number of back-to-back sorties that helped contribute to his total of 173 in Vietnam (Smith, 2008).”

In “Black Ceiling,” I shared, in exhaustive detail, the career paths of fighter pilots who became three- and four-star generals. I discovered that there is a typical career path for aviators on the fast track. Considering Brigadier General McGee’s stellar combat career, he should have been given the opportunity to become a commander of a flying group or a flying wing. Considering the timeframe of his career, it is easy to say that the racial climate of the time would not have permitted Charles McGee to attain the rank and recognition he deserved. This assessment is accurate, as this rationale was used to support his honorary promotion to the rank of Brigadier General by the president.

     During the Korean crisis, the Air Force again prioritized diversity to achieve its combat objectives:

“Besides a possible dearth of pilots, Washington faced other intractable issues as the Korean War unfolded. Earlier, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal decried the public's perception of "leaders of the aircraft industry...as warmongers for profit."35 This view, he claimed, was not helpful insofar as securing ever-larger appropriations for the U.S. Air Force was concerned. In 1949, Air Force Secretary Symington pointed out that Boeing-one of the nation's and the world's chief suppliers of aircraft" anticipate[d] little additional commercial business in the near future." This made the Seattle behemoth even more dependent upon an 36 Air Force that was facing peculiar problems all its own. The Air Force's problems in securing pilots served to increase the momentum behind its recruitment efforts among a community African Americans--that long had evinced interest in aviation. That community had persisted in its interest, often under the most adverse conditions, that made operating jet fighters seem plush and comfortable by comparison. Tuskegee Airmen notwithstanding, that shift would involve a reversal of centuries of encrusted and inured policies of slavery, racism, and Jim Crow, thus making the most feasible recruitment remedy the most difficult to pursue.”

But what about more recent times? Does the Air Force still prioritize diversity in crisis? Here’s something I wrote in “Black Pilot”:

“The Air Force’s pilot shortage crisis offers ‘an opportunity for bold moves’ to build the service’s diversity while correcting the growing deficit in aviators, Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein said Wednesday at the conclusion of a daylong summit on the problem. Those moves might include grouping minority pilot trainees together at flight school in order to have a built-in support system…’ (Tirpak, 2018)

…The Air Force’s pilot shortage wasn’t a crisis worthy of crisis-level responses until there weren’t enough non-minority pilots to put in cockpits. The Air Force has had a shortage of minority pilots since the Creech era, post-Vietnam targeted drawdown that I refer to in “Black Ceiling” as “the Great Black Out.” In this drawdown, minority fighter pilots were overwhelmingly and disproportionately selected in the Air Force’s fighter pilot cuts. In “Black Ceiling,” I stated that it is the single greatest reason we do not have greater diversity in the Air Force fighter pilot force, at every rank, even today.

     The Air Force’s crisis response considerations in 2018 again reinforce the fact that the non-minority pilot shortage is viewed as a crisis, yet the shortage of minority pilots historically has not been.

     That whole discussion leads to the most controversial questions in this book. Does the Air Force really want an influx of black pilots? Is it ready for this kind of cultural shift? What outlandish questions, you might say, but looking back over the Air Force’s history, often the answer has been negative.

…Currently, the Air Force is showing a greater interest in minority pilots because of the pilot shortage. I have seen similar surges in interest in the airline industry as I have studied the history of its diversity growth. (Flying Beyond The Barrier Memoirs by Forty African American Airline Pilots, 2015) In the airline industry, when the pilot crisis waned, the interest in diversity, which was motivated by empty pilot seats, also waned.

   …Perhaps the pilot shortage is the ‘profit motive’ the Air Force needs to sustain its diversity initiative. History, however, has not shown that to be the case.”

“In ‘Black Pilot,’ I wrote that I believed that the crisis-level need for black pilots would end once the cockpit crisis/shortage of white pilots ended. I ventured that all the bold moves that had been taken to build a cadre of minority pilots, such as partnering with AFJROTC and launching the ACE program, would never make their way into the Air Force’s Five-Year Planning Programming Budgeting processes (FYDP)—thus making them a diversity ‘experiment’ vs. commitment, let alone a ‘strategic imperative.’”

Even as late as the Air Force’s 70th birthday in 2018, diversity was only a priority at the highest levels in a time of crisis. A shortage of pilots equates to a diminished capability for the Air Force to accomplish its combat missions, therefore making it a crisis. In “Black Pilot State of the Union,” I predicted that the urgency related to building a pipeline of minority pilots would subside when the pilot shortage ended. I said that these diversity initiatives would not become a lasting part of the Air Force’s budget or the way it conducts its business.

     The urgency for these diversity initiatives did lessen as the pilot shortage subsided, and diversity did not become a top priority again until the next crisis, the George Floyd crisis.

     According to a RAND study titled “Leveraging Diversity for Military Effectiveness,": “’The Armed Forces need to effectively leverage all available advantages, including those stemming from their workforces, to maximize strategic and operational effectiveness.’ Supported by a growing body of literature on diversity and inclusion, many military organizations now recognize that workforce diversity is one factor that contributes to organizational effectiveness. There is however a need for a more comprehensive understanding of the full spectrum of potential advantages that can be gained by employing a diverse workforce.”

     I maintain that this eloquently articulated justification for “employing a diverse workforce” does not apply to an organization like the Air Force, which has no competition for these scarce diverse workforce resources except during times of crisis.

“Diversity, Equity, Inclusion Are Necessities in U.S. Military
Feb. 9, 2022 | By Jim Garamone, DOD News |
Diversity, equity and inclusion in the military are necessities for the United States, Bishop Garrison, the senior advisor to the secretary of defense for human capital and diversity, equity and inclusion said.

     Some 41 percent of the military identify as members of minority groups, and that number will grow larger, Garrison said. The military must be able to attract, train and retain them for the services to retain competitive edges, he said.’ ‘I want people to see [diversity, equity and inclusion] as another tool in the toolkit and another way of solving these problems.’" 

 Mr. Bishop Garrison described “members of minority groups” as a means for the services to retain competitive edges.” I have already shown that the Air Force’s only competitor for these resources is other employers. The Air Force has demonstrated throughout its existence that it can still be the best Air Force on earth without making diversity a top priority, except in times of crisis. What happens when there are no more Charles McGees and C.Q. Browns left to tap in a crisis because they’ve all found opportunity and success outside the military? The Air Force is banking on never having to find out.